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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether intellectual capital (IC) and sha-
riah governance jointly affect the economic performance of Islamic banks
(IBs). In contrast to prior research, this paper disaggregate IC and corporate
governance features and examine whether the two are jointly related to eco-
nomic performance. These relationships are further explored before, during
and after the financial crisis based on a sample of 64 Islamic banks operating
in different regions during the period 2007–2014. The required data to calcu-
late different constituents of IC efficiency and governance mechanism is hand
collected from 512 annual reports. After controlling for other corporate gover-
nance and bank-specific characteristics (operational type, bank size, listing sta-
tus, risk, type of auditor, accounting standard and region), we find both
intellectual capital efficiency and shariah governance proxies (size and domi-
nance of prominent scholars of shariah supervisory board) to have a significant
positive relationship with accounting measure of performance. However, based
on market performance measure, only one proxy for shariah governance
mechanism, that is, prominent scholars on SSB, is found to be significant but
in the negative direction. These results provide important insights into the
relationship between IC efficiency, corporate governance and performance in
Islamic banking business model and have policy and practical implications.
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G01; G20; G21; G32; G34; O15; O16; O34
1 | INTRODUCTION
Driven by religious business ethics, Islamic banks entered
the main stream financial services sector about half a
century ago to provide banking solutions that comply
with Islamic jurisprudence (shariah) which eschew inter-
est (riba), speculative trading or investments (gharar),
excessive risk taking – in their investment and financing
dealings and involve Islamic banks in the risk sharing of
the proceeds and revenues of the borrower (Beck,
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Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013). Shariah compli-
ance also prohibits issuance of debt/new products against
debt/credit, that is, financial securitisation (Nawaz &
Virk, 2019). In addition to these ontological and episte-
mological covenants, shariah places strong emphasis on
justice and fairness and as such, requires all financial
transactions to be backed by a real economic transaction
that involves tangible assets (Nawaz, 2019) and restricts
the use of many derivative products, including reasons
such as excessive uncertainty, writing credit over credit,
or derivative transactions that defer the transfer of
money/capital and commodity/product in future
(Obaidullah, 2005). The risk-sharing covenant of Islamic
banking business model, require designing saving
accounts that make depositors/investment account
holders' return non-interest bearing and gives IBs discre-
tion in to pay a return that based on IBs overall profit-
ability or for that matter losses. Operationally, the
revenue streams of IBs come mainly from investment,
trade-based profit and fee-based services while their
asset-side products can be either equity-based such as
musharakah (capital-capital partnership) and mudarabah
(capital-labour partnership or joint venture), or interest-
free debt-based products like ijarah (leasing) and
murabahah (cost-plus sale). Hence, the business model of
Islamic banks is clearly different from conventional
banks as it is faith-driven and must be shariah-compliant.
This also means that the components of their financial
statements are to some extent different from that of con-
ventional banks.
Despite its impressive growth and recognition by the
World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2013–14
as a major force in global banking enjoying an annual
growth rate of 15–20% and assets exceeding US$2 trillion
by 2014 (Nazim & Bennie, 2012), Islamic banks cannot
remain complacent as competition in the banking sector
has intensified over the past decade (Ariss, 2010). Hence,
it is imperative for Islamic banks to consider embracing
new strategic priorities such as efficient investments in
new capital and putting in place appropriate governance
mechanisms that will help in sustaining their
performance.
As one of the most knowledge-intensive industries
(Chen, Danbolt, & Holland, 2014; Mavridis &
Kyrmizoglou, 2005), banks, including Islamic banks, no
longer rely on their physical capital to maintain their per-
formance. Efficient and effective management of and
investments in intangible assets, or also referred to as
intellectual capital (IC), are deemed essential to achieve
and sustain superior performance (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996). IC has also been acknowledged as
the most important source of competitive advantage that
will lead to innovation of new products (Subramaniam &
Youndt, 2005) and better quality services and in turn, bet-
ter bottom line. While there has been a number of studies
that have looked at the association between IC and per-
formance of conventional banks in different countries
(Goh, 2005; Ismail & Karem, 2011; Mondal &
Ghosh, 2012; Pulic, 2004), the results have been mixed.
Since Islamic banks need to generate new innovative sha-
riah-compliant products to compete in the market, it is
expected that the nature of their investments in IC will
be different and in turn on their performance. Therefore,
a study is needed to provide insights on the relationship
between IC and Islamic banks' performance to see if they
are (dis)similar to other prior studies.
One important component of IC is related to invest-
ments in human capital as bank performance also relies
on good governance mechanisms to constrain agency
problems and moral hazard. This aspect has received sub-
stantial attention especially following the financial crisis
(Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2012). While conventional
banks adopt a single layer governance mechanism or uni-
tary board system, Islamic banks have an additional layer
of governance in the form of a shariah supervisory board
(SSB) that provides oversight on commitment to ethical
or shariah-compliant practices (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006)
such as ensuring that banks are not involved in interest
and speculation in their lending and investment activi-
ties, which may subsequently affect performance. Yet
there are limited studies that have considered to what
extent investments in SSB's members contribute to per-
formance of Islamic banks.
Therefore, this paper contributes to both the IC and
bank performance literature by exploring the relationship
between intellectual capital efficiency and shariah gover-
nance mechanism on Islamic banks' performance while
controlling for a number of other corporate governance
and bank-specific characteristics. While there have been
many studies examining effects of various factors on
banks' performance during the financial crisis, there has
not been any studies that have considered the association
between IC and banks' performance. Banks investment
strategies in IC and governance mechanism may be dif-
ferent following financial crisis and in turn on their per-
formance. Hence, we further contribute to this line of
literature by exploring the relationship between IC and
shariah governance mechanism on Islamic banks' perfor-
mance before, during and after the financial crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the background and development of
hypotheses for the current study. An outline of the
research design is then presented in Section 3 followed
by the empirical results in Section 4. The paper ends
with the concluding remarks and avenues for further
research.
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2 | BACKGROUND AND
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Banks' performance may be affected by both micro- and
macro-economic factors (see Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Die-
trich & Wanzenried, 2011), which in turn have important
implications not only on investors and depositors but also
to the economy and society. The literature on determi-
nants of bank performance can be split into those that
are internal and those that are external (Staikouras &
Wood, 2011). The former is associated with factors that
are influenced by banks' management decisions and pol-
icy objectives such as effectiveness in managing the bal-
ance sheet structure (Wall, 1983), governance aspects
(Sierra, Talmor, & Wallace, 2006) as well as investment,
marketing and operational strategies. The latter, on the
other hand, are concerned with factors that are
influenced by events outside the bank such as regulatory
and macroeconomic factors. However, the extant litera-
ture on bank performance has failed to consider effi-
ciency of banks' intangible assets investment strategies
on their performance, especially in the context of finan-
cial crisis.
Likewise, the extant literature on Islamic banks' per-
formance has either explored determinants of perfor-
mance on a single country basis, for example, Pakistan
(Akhtar, Ali, & Sadaqat, 2011), Malaysia (Wasiuzzaman
& Tarmizi, 2010) or compared performance between con-
ventional and Islamic banks in a single country or region
such as Safiullah (2010) for Bangladesh; Onakoya and
Onakoya (2013) for UK; Hanif, Tariq, Tahir, and
Momeneen (2012) for Pakistan; Elsiefy (2013) for Qatar;
Olson and Zoubi (2008) and Srairi (2009) for the GCC
and only a few have examined across countries (Beck
et al., 2013; Johnes, Izzeldin, & Pappas, 2014). These
studies have also considered both macroeconomic (infla-
tion, GDP growth) and bank specific characteristics
(bank size, credit risk and operational cost) including cor-
porate governance as possible determinants for Islamic
banks' performance.
Our paper extends previous studies by focusing on
two internal factors related to management's strategic
investment policies and introduced an external factor
based on financial crisis. In the following sections, we
discuss each of them in more detail and develop our
hypotheses accordingly.
2.1 | Islamic banks' performance and
intellectual capital
According to the resource-based view of the firm, gaining
sustained competitive advantage requires organizations
to exploit the bundle of tangible and intangible resources
that they have (Penrose, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1984) into
valuable resources that are neither imitable nor substitut-
able without great effort. The significance of intangible
assets along with the traditional tangible economic
resources, that is, land, labour and capital for superior
economic returns and sustained market valuation –
underpinned by the resource-based view of the firm is
gaining acceptance in various research streams stretching
from economics, finance and accounting to organiza-
tional and strategic management studies (Reed, Lubatkin,
& Srinivasan, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising to find
organizations becoming increasingly reliant on knowl-
edge and experience (Stewart, 1998), which constitutes
intellectual capital (IC) or also referred to as intangibles
(Villalonga, 2004), rather than physical assets in creating
value. IC refers to the knowledge resources used to create
value and attain competitive advantage in the market. IC
can be further broken down into human capital (HC)
and structural capital (SC), with the former embedded in
the organization's employees while the latter refers to the
supportive infrastructure enabling knowledge to be
converted into something owned by the organization
(Edvinsson & Malone, 1997). Petty and Guthrie (2000)
include another component of IC called relational capital
which refers to the ability of the organization in creating
and building relational capital with its external stake-
holders through, for example, customer and brand loy-
alty, customer satisfaction, market image and goodwill,
power to negotiate, strategic alliances and coalitions
(Joshi, Cahill, Sidhu, & Kansal, 2013).
Following the rapid growth in the services sector,
researchers have started to pay more attention to IC in
the banking sector (Goh, 2005; Ismail & Karem, 2011;
Joshi et al., 2013; Mavridis & Kyrmizoglou, 2005). It has
been suggested that value creation in knowledge-inten-
sive sectors such as the banking industry requires both
IC and physical assets (Chen et al., 2014; Marr &
Adams, 2004). Likewise, Goh (2005) recognizes the
importance of physical capital but further argues that in
the banking sector, it is IC that determines the quality of
services provided to customers. Ismail and Karem (2011)
note that human capital is the main driver of perfor-
mance in banks and Nawaz (2019) suggest that banks
need to invest in the training of their human resources
(i.e., HC), brand building, systems and processes (SC) to
ensure competitive success.
One popular method of assessing value added by the
company's resources (Firer & Williams, 2003) is the value
added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) model developed by
Pulic (2000). It is suggested that the higher the bank's
VAIC and its sub-components, that is, human capital effi-
ciency (HCE), structural capital efficiency (SCE) and
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capital employed efficiency (CEE), the greater will be its
competitive advantage leading to better firm perfor-
mance. Studies that focused on the relationship between
IC efficiency and bank performance based on VAIC
model find conclusive evidence of a positive relationship
between the two (Mondal & Ghosh, 2012), particularly
human capital (Goh, 2005). However, the relationship
between IC efficiency and Islamic banks' performance
has been relatively unexplored.
The resource-based view of the firm further holds that a
firm evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of its resources
and then selects an achievable strategy accordingly. Human
capital is one of the underlying strategic resources that is
both supportive and necessary for organizational success
since employees' knowledge and skill are essential in
knowledge intensive firms such as banks (Subramaniam &
Youndt, 2005), including Islamic banks. We argue that
knowledge embedded in the shariah supervisory board
members provides Islamic banks with increased cognitive
abilities (i.e., offering fatwa for complexed financial instru-
ments), which distinguishes the human capital stock of
Islamic banks than their conventional rivals. Islamic banks
exploit such human capital resources to achieve and sustain
competitive advantage in the market.
Since IC resources drive a firm's capability to innovate
(Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), we argue that this is more
so in the case of Islamic banking and finance institutions.
They need to have higher investments in human intellec-
tual capital since many of the employees may have less
experience on the shariah banking model. Islamic banks
also need to invest in structural capital to support innova-
tion of the new business model. In addition, Islamic banks
need to effectively manage the different types of financial
resources as this is vital for gaining competitive advantage.
Human intellectual capital is particularly important
for Islamic banks because the creation and endorsement
of ethical products that are shariah compliant and the
ability to cater to the needs of various groups of cus-
tomers require human resources that have higher aware-
ness of fiqh muamalat (Islamic jurisprudence that deals
with commercial and business activities) as well as hav-
ing competency in banking-related knowledge.
Similarly, shariah compliant products and services
require different treatments when recording contracts
and transactions than conventional banks. Therefore,
Islamic banks need to invest in infrastructure and com-
puter networks that are better suited to deal with the
complexity of their transactions. In short, value creation
in Islamic banks is dependent on efficient and effective
investments in human and structural capital, which will
lead to tangible (e.g., new products or processes) and
intangible (e.g., more experienced employees likely to
engage in future product and service innovations)
outputs, and subsequently better banks' performance.
Therefore, our first hypothesis, based on both accounting
and market based measures of performance, is stated as
follows:
H1 There is a statistically significant positive association
between an Islamic bank's performance and VAIC.
H1a There is a statistically significant positive associa-
tion between an Islamic bank's performance and its
human capital efficiency (HCE).
H1b There is a statistically significant positive associa-
tion between an Islamic bank's performance and its
structural capital efficiency (SCE).
H1c There is a statistically significant positive associa-
tion between an Islamic bank's performance and its
capital employed efficiency (CEE).
2.2 | Islamic banks' performance and
shariah governance
Islamic banks must at all times ensure that their aims,
operations, business affairs and activities comply with
shariah. The consequences of shariah non-compliant
activities can potentially tarnish the banks' reputation
and reduce the confidence of depositors, investors, cus-
tomers, and other stakeholders which in turn, affect their
performance. In order to provide religious legitimacy to
their activities, Islamic banks appoint a number of sha-
riah scholars to sit on their Shariah Supervisory Board
(SSB). Members of this board play a vital role in provid-
ing input to Islamic banks on matters enabling the banks
to comply with shariah principles. This includes setting
shariah related rules and principle, issuing verdict (fatwa)
and overseeing compliance to ensure that policies and
procedures of the banks are in conformity with shariah
(Nawaz, 2019). Therefore, investment in shariah board
members is an important strategic decision undertaken
by Islamic banks. Having a large shariah board may sig-
nal to the banks' stakeholders of their commitment in
ensuring their activities are shariah compliant which in
turn may boost their performance. Since some shariah
scholars have higher reputation and credibility than
others, having more prominent scholars on the SSB will
further enhance the banks' legitimacy and performance.
Hence, we hypothesize the following two hypotheses:
H2 There is a statistically significant positive association
between an Islamic bank's performance and the
size of its SSB.
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H3 There is a statistically significant positive association
between an Islamic bank's performance and having
more prominent scholars on its SSB.
2.3 | Islamic banks' performance and
corporate governance
While there have been many studies conducted on the
relationship between corporate governance and perfor-
mance in the non-financial sector (Haniffa &
Hudaib, 2006), studies in the context of banks and more
specifically Islamic banks, have been limited and needs
examining.
2.3.1 | Board structure and bank
performance
It has been suggested that bigger boards will negatively
affect firm performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003)
because of coordination costs and free-rider problems
while smaller boards may enhance monitoring capabili-
ties (Khanchel, 2007; Yermack, 1996). On the other hand,
bigger boards may provide greater balance in promoting
effective decision making which may affect firm posi-
tively. It has also been argued that as board size
increases, control and monitoring functions will be
impaired (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999).
The results on the association between bank performance
and board size have been mixed. De Andres and Val-
lelado (2008) and Adams and Mehran (2012) find a sig-
nificant positive relationship between board size and
bank performance while Pathan and Faff (2013) find the
relationship to be negative. Other studies (e.g., Wintoki,
Linck, & Netter, 2012) find no economically significant
association between board size and firm performance, in
contrast. In the context of Islamic banks, larger boards
may provide balance for effective decision making
beyond religious matters. Conversely, in the presence of a
larger SSB the coordination costs of having larger board
may affect negatively on Islamic bank's performance.
Closely related to board size is board independence,
that is, the ratio of non-executive (outside) to executive
(inside) directors, and its relationship with performance.
Non-executive directors are needed to act as gatekeepers
in aligning management and shareholders' interest and
reducing management's opportunistic behaviour (Li,
Parsa, Tang, & Xiao, 2012; Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011),
thus contributing mainly to the monitoring role as
suggested by agency theory. On the other hand, resource-
dependence theory highlights the important advisory and
consulting role performed by non-executive directors
owing to their possession of resources needed by the firm
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Hill-
man & Dalziel, 2003; Machold & Farquhar, 2013), such
as expertise, prestige and networks, to help in the strate-
gic decision making process in enhancing performance
and maximizing shareholders wealth (Knockaert &
Ucbasaran, 2013). The results on the relationship
between bank performance and board independence are
also inconclusive. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and
Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2009) report a positive
effect while Pathan and Faff (2013) note a negative effect.
However, Adams and Mehran (2012) and Wintoki
et al. (2012) do not find a significant relationship between
board independence and firm performance. The incon-
clusiveness of the results and significance of outside
directors' role on the board, cited in the aforementioned
literature merits for further investigation in the context
of Islamic banks.
CEO power is another important attribute of effective
governance. Although the theoretical argument suggest
to separate the role of board's chairperson and the CEO
(see, among others, Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Patton &
Baker, 1987), the emperical evidience is far from reaching
a consensus. This is especially the case in studies con-
ducted in the context of Islmaic banks (e.g., Mollah &
Zaman, 2015; Nawaz, 2019). The conventional literature
strongly advocates for the separation of chairman and
CEO roles (see Jensen, 1993) and this is supported by the
empirical evidence, which suggests that CEO role duality
diminishes board independence, cute board's capacity to
oversight managers' actions and erupts decision making
process (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Lehn & Zhao, 2006;
Yermack, 1996). In the context of Islamic banks, giving
too much power to the leadership go against the Islamic
concept of shura (consultation) which calls for leaders to
always seek advice from a group before making decisions.
Similarly, strong and effective internal audit controls can
determine managers' behaviour in a timely fashion,
which in turn reduces information asymmetry between
the internal and external stakeholder and subsequently
improves firm performance (Chen & Chen, 2012; Kalbers
& Fogarty, 1993). Furthermore, the power of the audit
committee may be stronger if their number is relatively
large compared to the overall board size.
2.4 | Islamic banks' performance and
bank-specific characteristics
2.4.1 | Operating structure
Islamic banks may choose to operate as Islamic win-
dows or subsidiaries of conventional banks or operate
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as fully-fledged Islamic banks. The former is an opera-
tional strategy adopted by conventional banks for the
purpose of attracting customers from conventional to
shariah-compliant banking, meeting increasing demand
from customers for ethical products and improving
mobilisations of savings. The downside of operating as
windows or subsidiaries is that Islamic windows by
design have to spend more internally on staff recruit-
ment, training and development and externally on
branding and marketing to position themselves as sha-
riah-compliant business in the market to satisfy exis-
ting customers and attract potential clients looking for
shariah-compliant financial services. Such additional
costs may affect their bottom line. On the other hand,
fully-fledged banks may have lower training and
recruitment costs as staff have more specialized knowl-
edge and experience as well as lower marketing cost as
customers have more trust on their brand name and
products.
2.4.2 | Size, listing status & risk
On average, larger and listed banks are better performers
because they are able to diversify their risk and also they
have more analysts following which puts them under
more pressure to perform well. Banks with more debts in
their capital structure are more risky which may affect
their performance.
2.4.3 | Auditor type, accounting
standards & regions
Auditor quality is often associated with firm size and
engaging a Big4 auditor may reduce agency problems
and moral hazard which would contribute to better per-
formance. Islamic banks have a choice to either follow
IFRS, AAOIFI or its own country's standards and it is
expected that banks that follow the former standards will
show better performance as it is more flexible (principle-
based). Islamic banks operating in the Middle-East are
expected to perform better as they can draw from a larger
wealthy client base.
2.5 | Conceptual framework
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework showing the
relationships between the main explanatory factors and
Islamic banks together with the set of hypotheses dis-
cussed earlier.
2.6 | Effect of financial crisis on
relationship between IC and shariah
governance investments and Islamic
banks' performance
The banking sector has received increased scrutiny from
stakeholders following the financial crisis, which had
affected bank performance. Hasan and Dridi (2010) sug-
gest that Islamic banks were more resilient during the
crisis compared to their conventional counterparts and
hence, will continue to invest in IC and shariah supervi-
sory boards. Therefore, we expect the association
between such investments and Islamic bank's perfor-
mance to still hold before and after the financial crisis.
Thus, we test the following null hypothesis:
H4 There is no statistically significant difference in the
positive association between an Islamic bank's per-
formance and its IC efficacy variables before and
after the financial crisis.
H5 There is no statistically significant difference in the
positive association between an Islamic bank's per-
formance and its shariah governance variables
before and after the financial crisis.
3 | DATA, EMPIRICAL METHOD
AND VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
3.1 | Sample selection
We used BankScope database to extract financial data
related to the sampled banks. There were 147 Islamic
banks listed in BankScope database and after eliminating
banks due to limitations on data availability or no longer
in existence, our final sample consists of 64 banks operat-
ing in 25 countries covering a period of 8 years from
2007–2014, as can be seen in Table 1. This provides us
with 512 bank-year observations.
3.2 | Dependent and explanatory
variables
Table 2 presents a summary of the operationalisation and
source of the variables used in our model. The dependent
variable, bank performance, can be assessed in different
ways. For the purpose of this study, we used one com-
mon accounting based measures, that is, average return
on asset, ROAA (Usoff, Thibodeau, & Burnaby, 2002)
and Tobin's Q as the market-based measure (Weir, Laing,
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& McKnight, 2002). It has been argued that Tobin's Q is
endogenous with respect to managerial decisions regard-
ing a firm's scale, with underinvestment inflating Tobin's
Q (see Dybvig & Warachka, 2015). The authors further
contend that the q-ratio either increase or decreases
based on the relative importance of scale decisions versus
cost discipline, respectively. We acknowledged limita-
tions in using Tobin's Q as a market measure but have
used it due to data constraint for Islamic banks.
Our first independent variable is related to overall IC
efficiency. Following Pulic (2000), Goh (2005) and Mon-
dal and Ghosh (2012), we calculate the value added intel-
lectual coefficient (VAIC™) as proxy for the aggregate
intellectual capital efficiency consisting of HCE, SCE and
CEE. The general formula takes the form of:
VAIC™ = HCE + SCE + CEE. The next set of indepen-
dent variables is related to investments in shariah gover-
nance viz. shariah supervisory board size (SSBsize) and
domination of prominent scholars on shariah supervisory
board (SSBdominance).
Our corporate governance control variables include:
board size (LnBsize), board independence (Bindep)
based on proportion of independent non-executive
directors to total board size, CEO power (Dual) based on
whether the CEO is also the chairman, audit committee
size (ACS), audit committee power (ACP) based on pro-
portion of non-executives who are audit committee
members to total board size. Our bank-specific control
variables include bank operating structure, that is, full-
fledged or Islamic windows (OS), bank size based on
total assets (LnTA), risk based on debt to equity (Risk),
dummy variables for listing status (list), auditor type
(Big4), accounting standard based on IFRS or other
(Accstd) and region based on whether it is in the GCC
or other (Region).
3.3 | Econometric modelling
We used the following model to test our hypotheses.
Islamic banks’ performance: 
Accounting based (ROAA) 
Market based (Tobin’s Q) 
Shariah Governance  
SSB size  
SSB dominated by prominent scholars  
Intellectual Capital Efficiency 
Value added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) 
Human capital efficiency (HCE) 
Structural capital efficiency (SCE) 
Capital employed efficiency (CEE) 
Control variables 
Governance mechanisms: 
Board size 
Board independence 
CEO power 
Audit committee size 
Audit committee power 
Firm-specific: 
Bank operating structure 
Bank size 
Listing status 
Level of risk 
Auditor type 
Accounting standards 
Region 
H2 & H3
H1
FIGURE 1 Conceptual
framework
TABLE 1 Sample selection criteria
Sample
No of Islamic
banks
Initially identified Islamic banks 147
Islamic banks merged or not in business 11
Islamic banks with missing financial data 49
Islamic banks with missing corporate
governance data
23
Final sample size 64
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TABLE 2 Summary of operationalization of the variables
Variable name Acronym Operationalization Data source
Dependent variables
Return on average assets ROAA Net income available to stockholder/
average total assets
Bankscope
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus book value of
liabilities divided by book value of
assets
Bankscope/Annual report
Independent variables
Intellectual capital
Value added VA Total income – Total expenses excluding
personal expenses
Bankscope /annual report
Human capital HC Total personal expenses considered as
investments
Bankscope /annual report
Human capital efficiency HCE HCE = VA/HC, that is, value added/
human capital, or (Total income –
Total expenses excluding personal
expenses) divided by (Total personal
expenses considered as investments)
Structural capital SC SC = VA – HC, that is, value added –
human capital, or (Total income –
Total expenses excluding personal
expenses) – (Total income – Total
expenses excluding personal expenses)
Bankscope /annual report
Structural capital efficiency SCE SCE = SC/VA, that is, structural capital/
value added, or (VA-HC)/VA [(Total
income – Total expenses excluding
personal expenses) – (Total income –
Total expenses excluding personal
expenses)] divided by (Total income –
Total expenses excluding personal
expenses)
Capital employed CE Physical and financial capital employed
or Total assets + Total liabilities
Bankscope /annual report
Capital employed efficiency CEE CEE = VA/CE, that is, value added/
physical and financial capital
employed, or (Total income – Total
expenses excluding personal expenses)
divided by (Total assets+ Total
liabilities)
Value added intellectual coefficient VAIC VAIC = HCE + SCE + CEE
Shariah governance variables
Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size SSBsize Log of total number of members of SSB Annual/corporate governance
report
Domination of prominent scholars on
shariah supervisory board (SSB)
SSBdominance Proportion of prominent scholars to total
SSB members (in percentage)
Annual/corporate governance
report
Governance-specific variables
Board-size Bsize Log of total number of directors on board Annual/corporate governance
report
Board independence Bindep Proportion of independent non-executive
directors to total board size (in
percentage)
Annual/corporate governance
report
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Performancei,t = α+ βxnICi,t + βxnSGi,t + γxnControlxn + εtx ,
where Performancei,t is the proxy for the performance
variable of bank i at time t, ICi,t is the matrix of intellec-
tual capital efficiency variable of bank i at time t, SG i,t, is
a matrix of shariah governance variables of bank i at time
t, Control is a matrix of corporate governance variables
and bank-specific characteristics of bank i at time t, t,x is
the error term, α0 is the constant, and β and γ are the vec-
tors of coefficient estimates.
We used the model to analyze the effect of (a) intel-
lectual capital efficiency (VAIC, HCE, SCE and CEE),
and (b) shariah governance (SSB size, SSB domination by
prominent scholars), on bank performance (both
accounting and market-based) using return on asset and
Tobin's Q as proxies for performance. We used the pooled
OLS regression to test our model.
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics viz. minimum,
maximum, mean, standard deviation, standardized skew-
ness and kurtosis, for the dependent and independent
variables used in our models. Focusing first on the depen-
dent variables (Panel A), it can be seen that the mean for
ROAA is 8%, with a minimum of −13% and maximum of
77%. The negative minimum figure suggests some banks
in the sample making a loss. The mean for Tobin's Q is
1.08, ranging from a minimum of 0.49 to maximum
of 2.35.
As for the continuous independent variables (Panel B
rows 3–6), the mean for VAIC is 20.12, with a minimum
of 1.16 and maximum of 446.75, indicating that Islamic
banks in our sample are generally efficient in generating
value from their intellectual capital. The means for the
three sub-components, HCE, SCE and CEE are 18.51,
0.81 and 0.81, respectively. The high mean for HCE sug-
gests that it is the main value driver as indicated by the
effective utilization of human capital during the study
period. Further, as can be seen in Panel C, the value
added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) of Islamic banks
over the period has deteriorated from 25.37 in 2007 to
17.46 in 2014, suggesting reduction in HCE. The SCE and
CEE have remained relatively stable over the period. The
mean economic performance measured by ROAA and
Tobin's Q, respectively and average IC efficiency of sam-
pled IBs during the study period is illustrated in Figure 2.
With regards to shariah governance variables (Panel
B rows 7 & 8), the mean size of SSB is 4, with a minimum
and maximum of 1 and 14, respectively. This indicates
heterogeneity within the industry on Shariah-monitoring
policy. As for dominance of prominent shariah scholars
serving on SSBs, it can be seen that some banks are 100%
dominated by them and on average, they occupy about
26% of each SSB. Results reported in Panel C suggest that
Islamic banks were efficient in creating value using their
human, structural and financial resources during the
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable name Acronym Operationalization Data source
CEO power Dual Dummy; 1 = role duality, 0 otherwise Annual/corporate governance
report
Audit committee size ACSize Log of total number of members serving
on the audit committee
Annual/corporate governance
report
Audit committee power ACPower Proportion of non-executives who are
audit committee members to total
board size (in percentage)
Annual/corporate governance
report
Firm-specific control variables
Bank size LnBankSize Log of total assets Bankscope/Annual report
Listing status List Dummy; 1 = listed, 0 otherwise Bankscope/Annual report
Level of risk Risk Total debt/Total equity Bankscope/Annual report
Type of auditor Big4 Dummy; 1 = Big four, 0 otherwise Annual report
Bank's operating structure Bos 1 = Full-fledged, 0 = Islamic windows/
subsidiaries
Annual/corporate governance
report
Accounting standard used Accstd Dummy; 1 = IFRS, 0 otherwise Annual report
Region Region Dummy; 1 if the bank is located in GCC,
0 otherwise
Annual/corporate governance
report
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study period. The negative value for VAIC during 2008–
2011 suggest the impact of financial crisis and market
adjustment.
Table 3 (columns 8–20) also presents Pearson correla-
tion matrix for the continuous variables. It can be seen
that our variable of interest, VAIC, is significantly associ-
ated with both ROAA and Tobin's Q, with the former in
the positive direction and the latter in the opposite direc-
tion. All three sub-components of VAIC are significantly
and positively related to ROAA but negatively in the case
of Tobin's Q. In terms of shariah governance, SSB size is
positively and significantly associated only with ROAA
while dominance of prominent scholars on SSB is not sig-
nificantly associated with both performance measures.
The variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all regres-
sions is also computed for all regressions to check for
multicollinearity (column 8). The highest value of VIF is
2.94, well below the conventional value of 10. Likewise,
the lowest value of tolerance is 1.18, well above the con-
ventional value of 0.1. There is no multicollinearity
between the independent variables.
4.2 | Do intellectual capital efficiency
and shariah governance affect Islamic
banks' accounting and market
performance?
Table 4 presents the results for two sets of models: VAIC
and bank performance (Models 1 & 2), and sub-compo-
nents of VAIC and bank performance (Models 3 & 4).
The difference between Models 1 & 2 is that the former is
based on ROAA while the latter is based on Tobin's Q.
As can be seen in Model (1), the relation between
accounting performance measurement (ROAA) and
VAIC is positively and significantly related at the 1%
level, as expected, and the result is consistent with prior
studies for conventional banks (e.g., Pulic, 2004; Ting &
Lean, 2009). On the other hand, in Model (2), the relation
between the market performance measure (Tobin's Q)
and VAIC is insignificant and is in the direction opposite
to expectation. Hence, our hypothesis H1 is only
supported based on accounting performance. Our results
suggest that Islamic banks that are efficient in using their
intellectual capital are able to generate higher
profitability.
SSB size relates positively (at 5% significance level)
with profitability but insignificant based on market per-
formance measure, thus partially supporting H2. SSB
dominated by prominent scholars is significant at the 5
and 1% levels based on profitability and market value
respectively, with the former in the positive direction as
expected while the latter in the opposite direction. Hence,T
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our H3 is supported except that the direction for market
value is opposite to expectation. This indicates that the
market perceives less favourably banks with prominent
figures on the SSB although the results suggest that they
may help enhance banks' profitability. A further plausi-
ble interpretation of the results is that the market may
perceive prominent figures as an extra expense as com-
pare to relatively less known SSB members and may put
negative value to banks dominated by prominent shariah
scholars. Equally, some of the prominent scholars hold-
ing more than 50 SSB positions within the Islamic
finance industry, thus, such a high concentration may
signal the market the demand on one's time, which
relates negatively with market value. This merits for fur-
ther investigation by the future research in this area.
Models (3) & (4) show the relationship between bank
performance and the three VAIC sub-components. Based
on Models 3 and 4, the regression results indicate both
HCE and CEE to have highly significant effect on both
performance measures, with the former in opposite direc-
tion to expectation while the former in positive direction
as expected, thus supporting H1a and H1c. The negative
result for HCE performance suggest that high investment
on human capital reduces profit and market value, which
is contrary to prior studies (e.g., Goh, 2005; Mavridis &
Kyrmizoglou, 2005) for conventional banks. The positive
result for CEE indicates that efficient utilization of finan-
cial capital helps in generating profit as well as increase
market value, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g.,
Saengchan, 2008; Ting & Lean, 2009) for conventional
banks. However, SCE has a significant positive effect only
on ROAA (at 1% level), thus partially supporting H1b.
The result is contrary to Ting and Lean (2009).
In all four models, we include corporate governance
and bank-specific characteristics as control variables. In
terms of corporate governance, our regression results
indicate board size and board independence to have a sig-
nificant positive effect only on profitability. This result is
consistent with De Andres and Vallelado (2008) and
Cornett et al. (2009). Role duality, contrary to expectation
and inconsistent with Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) and
Krause, Semadeni, and Cannella (2014), is positive and
highly significant for both models, but in the direction
opposite to expectation. This suggests that role duality
may actually help enhance profitability and market value
as the CEO is able to pursue the vision of the bank more
effectively. Audit committee size is negatively and signifi-
cantly related only to profitability and in the direction
opposite to expectation which is inconsistent to sugges-
tion by Chen and Chen (2012). Audit committee power is
insignificant in both Models 1 & 2 but significant in
Model 3. The insignificant result is consistent with that
of Wintoki et al. (2012).
With regards to the business operational model,
regression results indicate fully-fledged banks to be sig-
nificantly related to profitability and market value with
the former in negative direction and the latter in opposite
direction. A possible reason for fully-fledged Islamic
banks to be negatively related to accounting profitability
may be attributed to higher operational cost, but posi-
tively related to market performance possibly due to the
market perceiving them to have higher growth potential.
Bank size has a significant negative effect on both
performance measures, suggesting that bigger banks are
less efficient but in the opposite direction to expectation.
A possible explanation for smaller Islamic banks to be
better performers may be attributed to less complex prod-
ucts and lower operating cost. Listed banks have signifi-
cant positive effect on profitability but negative effect on
market value. Risk and auditor type are both insignifi-
cant regardless of the performance measure. Adoption of
IFRS enhances profitability but not market value. Banks
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in the GCC have significant positive profitability and
market value.
4.3 | Do the relationships between IC
and shariah governance investments and
Islamic banks' performance differ before,
during and after the financial crisis?
Table 5 presents the regression results on the effect of
the relationship between the two investment types of
investments and bank performance before, during and
after the financial crisis. Based on accounting perfor-
mance (Models 1, 2 & 3) and the three VAIC sub-com-
ponents, it can be seen that CEE is the main driver for
profitability performance in all three periods. SCE is
positively significant in the period during and post-cri-
sis. The latter result suggests that efficient utilization
of structural capital becomes increasingly crucial for
generating profit following the crisis. On the other
hand, HCE is negatively associated with profitability in
all three periods but only significant during the crisis
period, suggesting that investments in human capital
will reduce profitability significantly during the crisis
period. Turning to market-based performance measure
(Models 4, 5 & 6), SCE is only significantly positive
with market value in the pre-crisis period. For the
post-crisis period, CEE and HCE are both significantly
associated with market value, positively in the case of
the former and negatively for the latter.
TABLE 4 Regression models of accounting and market based performance
Predicted
sign
Model 1
LnROAA
Model 2
LnTobin's Q
Model 3
LnROAA
Model 4
LnTobin's Q
Observations 512 512 512 512
R2 0.255 .287 0.513 .307
Adj. R2 0.233 .266 0.496 .284
SE 2.304 0.136 1.864 .134
(constant) −0.137 0.042 3.056** 0.107
Value added intellectual capital variables
LnVAIC (H1) + 0.208** −0.001
LnHCE (H1a) + −0.152** −0.010*
LnSCE (H1b) + 0.203**** 0.002
LnCEE (H1c) + 0.809**** 0.017****
Shariah governance variables
LnSSBSize (H2) + 0.728* 0.028 −0.530* 0.005
SSBdominance (H3) + 0.865* −0.107** 1.206** −0.101**
Governance control variables
Board size 0.117 0.005 0.261** 0.007
Bindep 1.074* 0.042 1.016* 0.047
Duality 2.613** 0.289** 0.940 0.262**
LnACSize −1.556* 0.031 −2.212** 0.023
AcPower 1.368 0.050 5.039** 0.121
Bank-specific control variables
Op. strategy −1.095** 0.030* −0.630** 0.035*
LnBankSize −0.310** −0.027** 0.081 −0.019**
List 0.597* −0.086** 0.643** −0.089**
Risk −0.004 0.000 0.002 0.001*
Big4 0.103 0.010 0.448 0.018
Accstd 0.722** 0.000 1.046** 0.007
Region 1.657** 0.144** 0.646* 0.125**
Note: *Significant at 5% and **significant at 1%.
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The variation in VAIC and its sub-components
before, during and after the crisis suggests that invest-
ment efficiency is closely related to the market condition.
As can be seen earlier in Panel C of Table 3, before the
crisis, HCE was in an upward trend (10% increase) while
CEE was in a downward trend (13% decrease). This sug-
gests that banks invest less in human capital during the
crisis and focuses more on improving efficiency of their
capital employed. However, the degree of change in
structural capital efficiency is steady regardless of the
economic conditions. This suggests that banks favour
adjusting HCE and CEE because they are more liquid
than their investment in SCE, which remains relatively
unchanged.
In terms of shariah governance variables, SSB size is
negatively associated to profitability in all three periods
but significantly during the crisis, which is understand-
able as more expenses incurred in paying bigger boards
will significantly reduce profitability. Results indicate
having prominent scholars on SSB to have significant
positive association with accounting performance in all
three periods but with diminishing effect. Based on mar-
ket value measure of performance, SSB size is not signifi-
cantly related while having prominent scholars on SSB is
TABLE 5 Regression models of accounting and market based performance for pre-, during and post-crisis
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Pre-
crisis
(2007)
During crisis
(2008–2009)
Post- crisis
(2010–2014)
Pre-
crisis
(2007)
During the crisis
(2008–2009)
Post-crisis
(2010–2014)
LnROAA LnROAA LnROAA
LnTobin's
Q LnTobin's Q LnTobin's Q
N 64 128 320 64 128 320
R2 0.649 0.504 0.566 0.498 0.414 0.351
Adj. R2 0.519 0.428 0.541 0.312 0.324 0.315
SE 2.173 2.054 1.668 0.157 0.116 0.131
(constant) −0.330 −4.232* 5.986** 0.064 0.155 0.123
VAIC components
LnHCE −0.192 −0.189* −0.097 −0.003 −0.006 −0.012*
LnSCE 0.075 0.302** 0.233** 0.028* 0.007 0.001
LnCEE 0.862** 0.714** 0.869** 0.004 0.008 0.027**
Shariah governance variables
LnSSBSize 0.076 −1.551** −0.279 0.049 0.038 −0.011
SSBdominance 2.175* 1.675* 0.743* −0.084 −0.088* −0.103**
Corporate governance variables
Board size 0.498 0.776** 0.050 0.000 0.002 0.010
Bindep 0.243 2.367** 0.880* 0.193 0.086 0.021
Duality −0.007 0.790 0.885 0.715** 0.322** 0.144*
LnAC.Size −5.217 −5.005** −0.734 −0.095 0.008 0.014
AcPower 13.370 13.411** 1.212 0.101 −0.060 0.261
Bank-specific variables
Op. strategy −1.050 −0.480 −0.442* 0.001 0.006 0.058**
Risk 0.013 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 0.00 0.001**
LnBankSize 0.203 0.408* −0.026 −0.011 −0.017 −0.019**
List 0.673 0.522 0.786** −0.047 −0.100** −0.097**
Big4 −0.055 −0.158 0.795** −0.086 −0.006 0.031
Accstd 1.988* 1.302* 0.754** 0.080 −0.017 −0.009
Region 1.236 0.823 0.198 0.172** 0.140** 0.106**
Note: *Significant at 5% and **significant at 1%.
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significantly and negatively associated with market value
during and after the crisis. This suggests that prominent
SSB members are perceived as an ultra-expense by the
market in the wake of financial malaise. Another inter-
pretation of the negative association is that the market
may hint to favour the non-prominent SSB members in
times of financial distress and thereafter because they
perceive prominent members have time constraint given
the demand on their time and that non-prominent mem-
bers may spend more time and extra efforts to study and
resolve issues during the crisis and later in the adjust-
ment period.
As for the control variables, board size and board
independence are positively and significantly associated
with profitability; the latter during and after the crisis
while the former only during the crisis. Audit committee
size and power are both significantly associated with
profitability only during the crisis period with the former
in negative direction and the latter in the opposite direc-
tion. Interestingly, role duality has no effect on profitabil-
ity in all three periods while it is the only variable to be
positively and significantly related to Tobin's Q in all
three periods but with diminishing effect.
Fully-fledged banks are significantly associated with
performance after the crisis period but in the negative
direction in the case of accounting measure. IFRS has sig-
nificant positive effect on profitability while GCC banks
have positive effect on market value in all three periods.
Banks audited by Big4 and listed banks are significantly
and positively related to profitability while large and
listed banks are negatively and significantly related to
market value, post crisis.
5 | CONCLUSION
The main objective of our paper is to identify whether
investments in intellectual capital and shariah gover-
nance have significant impact on performance of Islamic
banks, while controlling for other corporate governance
and bank-specific characteristics. Our regression results
based on VAIC suggest that Islamic banks have utilized
their resources efficiently leading to increase in profit-
ability but this was not reflected in the case of market
value. This highlights that the relationship between per-
formance and intellectual capital efficiency is dependent
on which performance measure is considered. Our
empirical results further reveal that both structural and
financial capital efficiency are the main drivers for bank
performance rather than human capital, as found in
many studies in the context of conventional banks (Chen
et al., 2014). The results for HCE suggest that the human
capital expenditure to support the ethical business model
adopted by the Islamic banks is expensive without opti-
mal output as of yet. The results can be attributed to the
phenomenal growth Islamic banking is experiencing
since the beginning of the new millennium. To sustain
the current growth trends, Islamic banks are spending
more on human capital resource (Hasan & Dridi, 2010).
However, in the longer run when the industry reaches
the maturity stage such expenditure are expected to relate
positively with Islamic banks' performance.
Our results regarding corporate governance reveal
role duality to be positively related to performance,
which challenges mainstream studies (Mishra & Niel-
sen, 2000; Pathan, 2009) and the corporate governance
code as well as the shuratic (consultation) concept in
Islamic ethics which sees dominance of power in one
hand may reduce board effectiveness. We further find
having more prominent scholars on the banks' SSBs help
boost profitability but reduce market value possibly due
to the market perceiving them as less independent and
too busy to actually perform their role effectively. Our
results elucidate and suggest an alternative view to
Mollah and Zaman (2015) on the role of shariah board in
Islamic banking business model.
Our analysis on the impact of the financial crisis indi-
cates some differences in the relationship between some
of the determinants and performance in the pre-, during
and post-crisis, suggesting that Islamic banks respond to
changing times by adjusting their strategies accordingly.
In times of financial distress Islamic banks tend to adjust
more liquid resources such as CEE and SCE and reduce
investments in less liquid resources such as HCE. In
short, our results indicate the two main variables of inter-
est in our study to be important determinants of Islamic
banks' performance and that their impact on perfor-
mance is dependent on macro-events.
Our study makes significant contributions to the corpo-
rate governance, intellectual capital and bank performance,
Islamic banks' performance literature streams, in particular.
The positive results of IC efficiency and shariah governance
mechanisms have important implications for the governing
and monitoring bodies responsible for designing strategies
and mechanisms that enable the Islamic finance industry to
compete effectively and also to sustain competitive advan-
tage in the market. The negative relationship between
prominent scholars on SSB and bank market performance
implies that the market pays less attention on who sits on
the SSBs. Thus, Islamic banks should not be investing too
much resources on prominent shariah figures to legitimize
their activities to market players.
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, macro-
economic factors such as GDP growth rate, inflation rate,
etc. in assessing Islamic banks' performance. Hence, the
future research may considering the impact of these
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variables while assessing Islamic banks' performance.
Secondly, some researchers have raised concerns on the
validity of VAIC as a method of measuring IC and future
studies may adopt other indicators in capturing IC.
Thirdly, we only focused on the impact on Islamic banks
and prospect researchers may consider a comparative
research study conventional vis-à-vis Islamic banks.
Fourthly, we used Tobin's Q as proxy for market perfor-
mance and future studies can consider other proxies such
as the operating efficiency measures (i.e., scale efficiency
and cost discipline) proposed by Dybvig and
Warachka (2015) when data is available.
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